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ABSTRACT

Vietnam h as only recently emerged as a participant in the
rapidly growing Asia Pacific economy, having rejected
central planning in favour of a m arket driven economy by
the late 1980s, and is now poised to become Asia’s next
economic “dragon”. Its economic performance during th e
1990s h as been truly remarkable, with the growth of real
GDP, consum er price inflation and export growth showing
considerable, and sustained, improvement over th a t of the
1980s. This contrasts starkly with the experiences of other
economies in transition, central and eastern Europe in
particular, whose transition process h as been considerably
more difficult, with severe dow nturns in GDP growth and,
in m ost cases, ruinously high rates of inflation. However
China, another transition economy, h as performed in
general better th a n Vietnam in terms of both of these
macroeconomic variables.
W hat m akes this performance even more remarkable is
th a t it h as been achieved against a background of loss of
foreign assistance from the former Soviet Union, a loss of
cheap im ports and the need to re-orientate its foreign trade
due to the demise of the CMEA (Council for M utual
Economic Assistance), no substantive multilateral or
bilateral assistance from the w est until late 1993, and the
US trade embargo, in existence since the end of the
Vietnam war, which only ended in February 1994.
A crucial factor behind this recent economic resurgence
of the economy h as been the decision by the government to
implement major economic reforms, in 1986 and later re
affirmed in 1989, which would transform the economy from
being centrally planned to a m arket economic system. A key
objective of this paper is, therefore, to identify the major
economic reforms which have already been instigated and
the macroeconomic performance of the economy since
1986, as well as its future economic prospects and
challenges emphasising, in particular, the crucial
contribution of foreign direct investm ent and overseas
development assistance (ODA) in this process.

This paper was presented at the twenty-third annual meeting of the Midsouth
Academy of Economics and Finance, February 7-10, 1996, Atlanta, Georgia,
USA.

INTRODUCTION

Vietnam has only recently emerged as a participant in the most
rapidly growing region of the world economy, the Asia Pacific
economy. It is poised to become one of Asia's most vigorous
market economies during the remainder of the 1990s and into the
twenty first century, having rejected central planning, and is
widely tipped to become Asia's next economic "dragon".
Considerable interest in its development and future prospects
have already been demonstrated by a number of economists and
economic institutions (see for example World Bank (1993),
Economist Intelligence Unit (1995), Quinlan (1995) and De Vylder
and Fforde (1995) to name but a few).
Its recent economic performance has been truly remarkable.
Real GDP growth was 8.7% in 1994, and is projected to be 8.0%
during 1995, and averaged 7.4% over the extended period 198994. Consumer price inflation dropped from 67.6% in 1991, the
highest since 1989, to 14.4% in 1994 and is projected to decline
further to 12.7% for 19951. Exports have also expanded rapidly
in recent years, increasing at an average annual rate of over 30%
since 1988, with rice production reaching a historical high in 1994
enabling the country to maintain its position since 1989 as the
world's third largest exporter of rice. This contrasts starkly with
the experiences of other economies in transition, central and
eastern Europe in particular, whose transition process has been
considerably more difficult, with severe downturns in GDP
growth and, in most cases, ruinously high rates of inflation. In
contrast China, another transition economy, has performed in
general better than Vietnam in terms of both of these

1 This projection was made by the IMF in May 1995.
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macroeconomic variables. However such a comparative analysis
is beyond the scope of this paper.
W hat makes the performance of Vietnam even more
remarkable is that it has been achieved against a background of
loss of foreign assistance from the former Soviet Union, which at
its peak amounted to $1 billion (US), a loss of cheap imports and
the need to re-orientate its foreign trade towards Asia in
particular with the demise of the CMEA (Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance), effectively no substantive multilateral or
bilateral assistance from the west until late 1993, and the US
trade embargo, in existence since the end of the Vietnam war,
which only ended in February 1994.
In spite of these successes Vietnam remains one of the poorest
countries in the world, with a per capita GNP of around $220
(World Bank). Decades of war and economic mismanagement
have left the economic infrastructure in very poor condition. In
recent years over 1 million workers and soldiers have been
released from the public sector, substantially increasing the ranks
of the unemployed. However social indicators remain quite good
for a country at the level of economic development which it has
achieved.
A crucial factor behind this recent economic resurgence of the
economy has been the decision by the government to implement
major economic reforms, in 1986 and later re-affirmed in 1989,
which would transform the economy from being centrally planned
to a market economic system. A key objective of this paper is to
identify the major economic reforms which have already been
instigated and the macroeconomic performance of the economy
since 1986, as well as its future economic prospects emphasising,
in particular, the crucial contribution of foreign direct investment
and overseas development assistance in this process.
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BACKGROUND

In April 1975 communist controlled North Vietnam took control
of Saigon, leading to the fall of the government of South Vietnam.
The nation was officially reunified in January 1976, and in July of
the same year the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was established.
The reunification of the North with the South brought together
two very different economic systems. The North with a state
socialist centralised economic system, and that of the South with
its decentralised market economic system. Initially, during the
Second Five Year Plan (1976-80), the communist government
attempted to impose the northern model on the South (the so
called "transition to socialism")—collectivisation of agriculture,
nationalisation of industries, state monopoly over trade etc.,
however as early as 1977 it was becoming clear that such a
strategy was not working. Declining agriculture production in
1977 and 1978, indicative of a general deterioration of the
economy, prom pted the first steps towards reform which were
initiated by the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee in
September 1979. This resulted in a number of piecemeal reform
measures thereafter and over the course of the Third Five Year
Plan (1981-85). The reform measures included giving private
enterprise, predominantly based in the South, greater autonomy
from the state, collectivisation of agriculture, subject to resistance
in the South, was suspended, the introduction of a contract
system giving households more freedom to sell their excess
production in the open market, and finally individual households
were allowed to cultivate land not in use by the cooperatives.
Economic performance improved noticeably over the Third
Five Year Plan, however the economy still encountered a number
of problems by the mid 1980s. These included a levelling off of
agricultural production, exacerbated by renewed attempts to
collectivise agriculture in the South in 1984, due to peasant
farmers destroying their crops and abandoning the sector
3

altogether. Inflation, however, was the biggest problem due
primarily to food shortages and a rapid increase in the money
supply. The latter primarily accounted for by the monetisation of
the state budget deficits. Over the period September 1985 to
September 1986 inflation rose to a ruinously high level of over
700%, prompting the government to accept the need for more
fundamental reform measures.
ECONOMIC REFORM UNDER "D O IM O I" OR RENOVATION
(1986-1989)

At the Sixth National Congress in December 1986 the government
introduced a comprehensive reform program, with the objective of
liberalising and deregulating the economy. The reform measures
explicitly recognised the failure of central planning and marked a
major turning point in the economic development of the economy.
The objectives of the reform were:
1.

to develop the private sector

2.

to increase and stabilise agricultural output

3.

to shift the focus of investment from heavy to light industry

4.

to reduce the role of the state enterprises

5.

to focus upon export led growth, based upon the experience of
Vietnam's dynamic regional neighbours

6.

to attract foreign direct investment, seen as essential for economic
development.

After 1987 a number of the far reaching reforms were
implemented, and this process was accelerated from 1989
onwards and into the 1990s, and included the following:
a. Rural reforms—the collective agricultural system was largely
dismantled, with the focus on family farming on the basis of
long term leases.
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b. Price liberalisation—virtually all price controls were removed
with the exception of fuel, electricity, transport and postal
services.
c. Devaluation —the exchange rate was unified and sharply
devalued. Foreign exchange trading floors were created
which enabled the exchange rate to be largely determined by
the market.
d. Interest rate reforms—interest rates were raised to very high
levels, with the objective of making real rates positive, as
part of the fight against inflation. After some initial success
in reducing inflation in 1989, real rates of interest were
allowed to become negative again and in 1990 and 1991
inflation returned. Since 1992 real interest rates have
primarily remained positive, contributing to the sizeable
decline in inflation thereafter.
e. Fiscal reforms—the government implemented measures to
reduce the growth of public expenditure, including the
demobilisation of the military (500,000 soldiers in total
have been released) and the elimination of direct subsidies
to state owned enterprises. Tax reform, in addition to the
fortuitous revenue from petroleum operations, enabled the
government to increase its revenues.
f. State enterprise reforms—included the elimination of direct
budgetary subsidies from the government, and a further
hardening of the budget due to the higher real interest rates
which had to be paid for credit as previously identified.
State enterprise managers by 1989 were no longer subject to
the need to achieve centrally determined production targets,
the influence of which had declined significantly since 1986,
but had greater autonomy in determining where their output
was sold and where input could be obtained from on the
basis of market prices.
g. Promotion o f the private sector—after many years of
discrimination the government now actively promoted the
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development of the private sector, although its contribution
to GDP is still small. Laws introduced for companies and
private enterprises gave the once informal sector official
sanction. This was identified further in the country's new
Constitution (in 1992) which clarified the rights of the
private sector.
h. Financial sector reform —this involved the restructuring of the
banks, which dominate the financial system, into a two tier
system with the State Bank of Vietnam performing the
function of a modem central bank, and the four major state
owned commercial banks providing banking facilities. The
financial system is being further expanded to include
shareholding banks, credit cooperatives and joint venture
banks. Foreign banks have been allowed to operate since
1991 and the government is developing a securities market
which is planned to be operative in 1996/97.
i. Legal system reform—arising from the creation of a market
system is the need to develop the institutional structures
necessary for its functioning. Of particular importance is the
reform, or creation, of a legal framework to provide the
framework for the operation of the market system, given the
reduced direct involvement of the government. For example
the introduction of a foreign investment law (1987),
bankruptcy law (1993), environmental law (1993), land law
(1993), and most importantly the 1992 Constitution which
proclaimed individual rights and guaranteed against the
nationalisation of foreign investments.
j. Openness to direct foreign investment—the government
recognised the importance of direct foreign investment in the
process of economic development, and a new investment
law, with subsequent revisions, indicated the government's
desire to attract such investment.
k. Foreign trade reform—this had been the monopoly of the
state, but now firms both state and private were to have
easier access to imports and more incentives to export. The
6

latter aspect was clearly seen as being important, being
based upon the export led growth of its dynamic regional
neighbours in East Asia.
1. Social reform —the reform program was seen as likely to
contribute to a transitional rise in unemployment, and in
response to this likelihood the government initiated
programs including retraining schemes and soft loans for the
small scale private sector.
In essence doi moi is characterised primarily by its focus upon four
key areas in particular—agricultural reform, price liberalisation
and state enterprise reform, trade liberalisation, and foreign direct
investment liberalisation.
Agricultural reform was regarded as a key constituent due to
problems w ith inconsistent and unpredictable yields. In April
1988, under the guidelines of resolution number 10, farming
cooperatives were no longer considered to be the centre of
production. Instead, farm households became the essential
production unit, with the cooperatives providing farm supplies,
storage facilities and marketing arrangements. Membership of a
cooperative became optional, and rights of full land use,
inheritance, and transfer were recognised by the state. Long term
leases were also extended, from 15-20 years for annual crops and
50 years for trees. These measures led to an immediate jump in
farm output such that after facing near famine conditions in some
parts of the country in 1988, Vietnam emerged as the world's
third largest rice exporter one year later. These measures were
supplemented by further agricultural reforms.
A second key area for reform is that of trade. Under the
centrally planned system, external trade was tightly controlled by
the government and it was focused towards that with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. All foreign trade transactions had to
be channelled through central state trading corporations. Prices
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were administered by the government and targets were fixed for
both imports and exports. Adding to the difficulty of trading was
the maintenance of a complex system of multiple exchange rates.
To improve the country's trade performance the dong was
devalued in early 1988, narrowing the spread between the official
and parallel market rates. In 1989 a new tariff schedule was
introduced, while quotas on imports and exports were lowered.
The monopoly held by the central state trading corporations was
eliminated when provincial and local authorities were allowed to
establish competing foreign trade companies.
Complementing the deregulation of trade was the liberalisation
of foreign direct investment, another key component of doi moi.
New regulations governing foreign investment became effective in
January 1988, and are considered to be some of the most liberal in
Asia. All sectors of the economy, in principal, are open to foreign
investors, although special incentives were attached to
investments that promoted exports and generated hard currency
earnings. Since the new foreign investment regulations came into
effect, Vietnam has approved nearly $9 billion in foreign
investment projects. However the number of projects actually
carried forward has been less.
With the collapse of the Eastern bloc in 1989 the focus of the
economic reforms has been placed upon the foreign trade regime
as Vietnam is forced to seek new markets (including suppliers) to
replace its Eastern bloc partners, and attention has been directed
towards the dynamic economies of East Asia. To encourage
exports exporters are allowed to retain 100% of their foreign
exchange earnings and, completing a series of adjustments that
began in 1987, the official exchange rate was brought into line
with the free market rate and was thereafter to be set by the
market. Export subsidies and a number of import duties and
export taxes were also abolished.

THE ECONOMY IN THE 1990S

This section attempts to identify recent macroeconomic
developments in Vietnam arising from the reform program
previously outlined. In doing so emphasis is given to
developments in GDP, savings and investment, consumer price
inflation, the exchange rate, exports, imports and the current
account over the period 1989-95 wherever possible.
The reforms have had a major impact upon the economy, and
it is once again important to emphasise that these have been
implemented without any substantive multilateral or bilateral
assistance until late 1993. There was a significant initial
improvement in the growth of real GDP in 1989 (see Table 1)
arising from the further impetus of reform measures in this year
and the further confirmation of the process of "doi moi",
primarily due to a substantial increase in output in the agriculture
and services sectors. These offset a sharp decline in industrial
production arising from the loss of markets and cheap imports of
inputs from the CMEA2, the elimination of budgetary subsidies to
the state owned enterprises, and the additional hardening of the
budget for them with the imposition of positive real interest rates
and loss of financial assistance from the former Soviet Union.
During 1990-91 these external developments contributed to a
downturn in the economy, which was very mild in comparison to
the recessions being experienced in Eastern Europe at the time,
w ith the growth of industrial production now overtaking that of
the agriculture and services sectors (see Table 1). The period
1992-95 has since seen a rapid pick up in the growth of the
economy, with the growth of industrial production leading the
way. The growth of services production has also been strong,
whilst that of agriculture has declined.

2 The CMEA was formally abolished in January 1991.
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A major contributory factor behind the growth of output is
domestic investment. In 1988 (see Table 2) total domestic
investment accounted for 8.1% of Vietnam's GDP, of which half
occurred through the state budget with foreign direct investment a
paltry 0.5% of GDP. Thereafter total investment accrued steadily
reaching 22.2% of GDP in 1994, of which only 6.6% took place
through the state budget and the remainder coming increasingly
from the domestic private sector and FDI. FDI accounted for 6.4%
of GDP, a twelve fold increase over the figure in 1988.
To fund such investment, and hence growth, the need for
domestic savings and access to foreign savings becomes
imperative. In 1988 domestic savings were negative and domestic
investment had to be funded from foreign savings, primarily
financial assistance from the Soviet Union (see Table 2).
Thereafter, as a result of the confidence engendered by the further
reforms from 1989 in terms of recognition of private sector rights,
reduced inflation, banking sector reforms and positive real
interest rates, domestic savings displayed a remarkable
transformation rising steadily from a figure of 5% of GDP in 1989
to 16.6% in 1994. The contribution of foreign savings declined
during the period 1989-92, but increased again in 1993 and 1994.
Such sources of savings will be crucial for Vietnam to fund its
desperately needed investment and growth.
Tables 1 and 2 give a useful insight into Vietnam's incremental
capital-output ratio (ICOR), which suggests that the growth rates
achieved over the period 1992-94 were achieved with an ICOR of
between 2-2.5. Other countries such as South Korea maintained
an ICOR of around 2.5 in the 1960s and 1970s, during the early
stages of its industrialisation. However this is unlikely to be
maintained, and the government has forecast that this will rise to
around 3 by the year 2000. This suggests that if Vietnam is to
maintain real growth rates of GDP at around 8%, investment as a
proportion of GDP will need to be around 24%. Hence domestic
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savings will need to increase (both in the public and private
sectors), and Vietnam will be dependent upon foreign private
sector savings and ODA for some time to come to make up any
deficiency.
The ICOR figure of 3 by the government has itself been
questioned. The case of Indonesia may provide a useful example.
Its ICOR was well above 5 in the early 1980s as growth rates fell
in response to austerity measures. During 1984-88 it fell to 4.6
and then 4 during 1989-93, but has since risen to 5 again. China
has grown more rapidly than Vietnam, but with an ICOR of about
4 it has taken very large investment flows to achieve its rapid
growth. The World Bank has pointed out that if Vietnam's ICOR
were even 3.9 in 1997 instead of 3, and the level of current
investment remained the same, GDP growth would fall from
above 8% to around 4% in that year.
Consumer price inflation (see Table 3) abated considerably in
1989 to 34.7% from 394.0% in 1988 (World Bank), however
further monetisation of the budget deficit in 1990 further fuelled
inflation. The authorities were determined to crack down on
inflation, however, and from 1991 the budget deficit was no
longer monetised. Since then inflation has come down noticeably
w ith the exception of 1994, in which inflation shot up mainly due
to the increase in food prices arising from the summer floods in
the Mekong Delta.
There were a series of currency devaluations in 1989, when the
official rate of the Dong was brought down from D386:$1(US) to
the then black market rate of D4200:$1(US). The currency
continued to fall again by mid 1990 reaching a low of
D14500:$1(US) in November 1991, but then appreciated to
D10800:$1(US) by the following August (see Table 3). Since this
time government intervention through the State Bank of Vietnam
and unusually large inflows of dollars, has maintained the rate at
around this rate since. The authorities are keen to maintain the
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stability of the local currency as part of its efforts to stem the
dollarisation of the economy. With this objective in mind a decree
limiting the use of foreign currency in everyday transactions came
into force in October 1994. On the other hand exporters have been
calling for some time for a steeper depreciation of the dong
against the dollar, to allow them to maintain competitiveness.
Until the reforms of 1988-89, Vietnam's recorded exports
covered only between one-third and one-half of imports. Even
before the reforms exports, increasingly, were going to the
convertible currency area (non CMEA countries, particularly in
Asia), although most imports continued to come from the non
convertible area (CMEA). An approximate balance between
convertible and non convertible exports was reached around
1987. The chronic trade deficits were largely covered by grant aid
and highly concessional credits from the former Soviet Union. The
collapse of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe from 1989
caused the gradual loss of those countries' markets and
commodity assistance, resulting in their almost complete
disappearance in 1991 when the CMEA was formally wound up
and the Soviet Union disintegrated. The reforms to the trade and
foreign exchange regimes of 1988-89, and Vietnam's emergence as
an exporter of rice and crude oil, generated a compensating
increase in exports to the convertible area (primarily Japan,
Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea, but also
increasingly Western Europe). In dollar terms merchandise export
earnings increased by 87% in 1989, and grew at an annual average
rate of 23% in the six years to 1994. However, even after several
years of rapid growth merchandise exports still represented only
around 20% of GDP and in 1994 were worth less than $50(US)
per head, well behind that of Thailand ($750(US) per head) and
Indonesia ($199(US) per head).
In 1994 there was a significant shift in the composition of
Vietnam's exports (see Table 5) as textiles and garments overtook
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sea products and rice to become the country's second largest
export earner after oil, and shoes also moved into the top ten
earners. Vietnam's prospects as a low labour cost exporter of
labour intensive manufactures will improve as it becomes
integrated in the East Asian and west European markets. Textile
and garment exports increased in 1994 by 57% to $550 million,
largely on the basis of increased sales to Western Europe which
absorbed about half of the total. Because it is denied Most
Favoured Nation (MFN) status, Vietnam is effectively excluded
from what it sees as potentially the largest market for its textiles,
the USA, despite the lifting of the trade embargo in February
1994.
In terms of Vietnam's overall current account performance (see
Table 4), the traditional deficit is likely to increase in the future on
the basis of the trade pattern which is already beginning to
emerge. Strong export growth is usually outpaced by an even
stronger and largely investment related import increase. There is
likely to be a further deterioration of the invisibles balance, as
indicated by developments in 1993 and 1994, arising from
increased net outflows of interest, profit and dividends. However
this is being offset by increasingly higher transfers, both public (in
the form of grant aid) and private, boosted by increased
remittances from overseas Vietnamese (Viet Kieu), whose
attachment to the homeland is being actively, and successfully,
encouraged by the government. In addition it is expected that the
invisibles balance deficit will be reduced by growing tourism
receipts. Tourist arrivals topped 1 million in 1994, a threefold
increase over 1991, and the government is hoping that 3 million
tourists per year will visit Vietnam by the year 2000.
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VIETNAM'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

Vietnam is strategically placed in the most dynamic region of the
world economy, although, as observed earlier, it is considerably
economically backward by comparison with some of its
neighbours. After the second world war, in East Asia, Japan
became the first of a series of countries to rapidly develop, to be
followed in the 1960s and 1970s by Hong Kong, Taiwan, South
Korea and Singapore and then in the 1980s and 1990s by another
wave consisting of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Another
group of countries, for a variety of reasons, such as the
Philippines, Myanmar and Vietnam itself, missed out on the
economic success of their neighbours. Whilst Vietnam is entering
the developmental process relatively late, it is at least able to
derive lessons from the experiences of its newly industrialised, or
industrialising, neighbours (NICs). The economic success, for
instance, of South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and other countries
in the region was largely based on, and facilitated by, a number of
key variables, including: a strong central government with
relatively honest and competent civil servants managing the
economy; extensive land and agricultural reform; a strong
emphasis on education; a high savings and investment rate;
openness towards foreign trade (exports) investment and
technology; declining population growth rate; macroeconomic
stability.
How has Vietnam fared relative to such developmental
criteria. Whilst political power is highly centralised in Vietnam
economic power is highly decentralised (the importance of
provincial and local governments are relevant here), and civil
servants are underpaid and not well educated in the ways of a
market economy. A key component of the reforms has been
directed towards the agricultural sector and these have proved to
be very successful as alluded to previously. During the period of
central planning high priority was given towards health and
14

education, however recent cuts in government expenditure have
caused these areas to suffer. Whilst Vietnam has a high literacy
rate (90%) and 100% primary school enrolment, its educational
system and technical training facilities have deteriorated
significantly over the past decade. Domestic savings have
improved and this is facilitating more investment, however the
financial system needs to be developed further to ensure that
domestic savings for productive usage is expanded further. Since
the late 1980s Vietnam has become increasingly open to foreign
trade and investment, having some of the most liberal foreign
investment laws in Asia for example. Macroeconomic stability is
being achieved, as indicated in a previous section, however the
population growth rate still remains too high (2. 1%).
Vietnam has made, therefore, some headway in regard to
achieving desirable outcomes in regard to the growth criteria.
However it is also clear that while lessons can be learned from the
experiences of the older NICs (Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) it is
also clear that economic circumstances have changed in the 1990s,
with increased economic integration in regard to trade and finance
suggesting that a policy of strong government intervention in the
economy, adopted by these countires, may no longer be
appropriate or possible. Hence the more recent experiences of
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand may be more appropriate.
Vietnam has become more integrated into the world economy
through a combination of foreign direct investment and foreign
trade. With its recent membership of ASEAN3 it has become a
natural trading and investment partner of the emerging SouthEast and East Asian bloc. This region tends to favour a free trade
rather than protectionist outlook, which will reinforce the
tendency for Vietnamese international economic policy to be
strongly, if not radically, free trade in its orientation.

3 In July 1995.
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Because the world economy in the 1990s is vastly different
from that of 1950-70 and Vietnam's internal circumstances are
also significantly different from those of the older NICs when
their growth spurt began, Vietnam will have to follow its own
path. Its late emergence to the capitalist economic scene implies
that Vietnam must simultaneously undertake four trans
formations: agricultural renovation, reconstruction / construction
of its basic infrastructure, develop import substituting industries,
and expand the export of manufactured goods. This contrasts
with the NICs who were able to go through each of these in
discrete stages.
Agricultural renovation in Vietnam has two chief tasks: raising
the productivity of the sector's existing resource base, and
secondly to expand the base into hitherto neglected areas such as
fruit and vegetable growing and livestock rearing. However
agricultural renovation will also be important for the generation of
savings, foreign exchange and surplus labour, which will assist in
the process of industrialisation. This will result in a higher
demand for consumer goods encouraging the development of rural
industries such as agro-processing and handicrafts, which will
provide jobs for the work force made redundant after the
productivity gains in agriculture.
Considerable construction, or reconstruction, of the economy's
infrastructure will be required after decades of war. Roads,
bridges, ports, railways and airports need upgrading and
extending, and especially in the rural areas. Housing and other
urban infrastructure need major investment. Major expenditure is
also required in education, health and the protection of Vietnam's
fragile environment.
Vietnam is also seeking the creation of import substituting
industries, for the following reasons. Firstly, to meet the growing
domestic demand for consumer durables, building materials and
industrial inputs arising from increased incomes in the agricultural
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sector. Secondly, to make better use of the country's natural
resource endowment, and thirdly to improve the trade balance.
Higher domestic savings would provide some of the funds to
invest in these industries, but foreign capital would also be
available particularly from countries with their own heavy and
labour intensive industries to export. The government would offer
protection for these infant industries in the form of tariff barriers,
cheap credits, and subsidies to keep wages low. However it is
necessary to distinguish between what the Government might like
to do and what it can do. The government appears to be trying to
encourage import substitution to the extent that it can, however,
the policy options for the Vietnamese government, and tine
international environment, are significantly different from those
faced by countries such as South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s.
With regard to product markets, Vietnam is effectively unable to
control its borders and thereby control imports. Additionally,
international private capital flows are far more significant and
more mobile than in the past. Hence Vietnam will need to create
an environment that is seen to be attractive to foreign investors
when compared with other countries.
The final component of the development strategy is the
development of export oriented manufacturing. Until recently
Vietnam's export growth was heavily based on primary
commodities. In 1994 there was both growth and diversification
as garments, in particular, found a lucrative market in the
European Union. This is a trend which has been encouraged by
the government, meeting with a ready response from the older and
newer NICs looking for places in which to relocate their labour
intensive industries. The country has an advantage in having a
highly motivated low cost workforce, preferential access to
certain markets and a government keen to develop export
processing zones (EPZ) which are ideal for small scale
manufacturers not interested in developing backward linkages
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into the economy. Foreign direct investment has largely been in
export oriented areas, where investors can circumvent Vietnam's
weak physical and institutional infrastructure. The EPZ's offer a
free trade environment, access to infrastructure and even better
incentives than are on offer elsewhere.
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE.

Despite its recent successes, the ability of the government to
maintain a fast rate of economic growth and development, and to
be Asia's next newly industrialised country, will require the
country to successfully address the following key challenges.
1.

Deploy its resources effectively

the nation needs to utilise its scarce resources efficiently,
requiring raising productivity levels in the agricultural sector,
utilising the entrepreneurial flair of southern businessmen,
encouraging overseas Vietnamese to invest locally, merging
viable state enterprises with private investors and utilising
overseas development assistance (ODA) well.
2.

Create equitable wealth

as a strategic priority, for both political and social reasons,
the country needs to narrow the gap between the "haves"
and the "have-nots" during the process of economic
development. The country's average per capita income is
roughly $220, although in some parts of the country income
levels are twice the national average (e.g. Ho Chi Mirth City).
3.

Control the rate o f population growth

Vietnam is a poor country which is likely to remain
impoverished until it is able to control the growth of its
population, which is currently standing at 2.1% a year. The
1.5 million annual increase in population serves to put further
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strain on the limited resources of the state, and to pu t severe
pressure on the nation's resources.
4.

Create employment

the recent loss of employment in the military, amounting to
some 500,000, and in other areas of the public sector such as
the state owned enterprises, 800,000, has contributed to
stubbornly high levels of unemployment. In combination with
substantial under employment in the rural areas, this
situation presents a major problem to the government. The
ability to maintain political stability, and the formation of a
consumer class providing the foundations for further
industrialisation, will require the government to bring about
the creation of jobs across the broad spectrum of society,
ranging from peasant farmers to university graduates.
5.

Maintain sound economic management o f the economy

the attainment of a stable macroeconomy is a key prerequisite
for further economic development of the economy, as clearly
evidenced by the experiences of its dynamic economic
neighbours. This will create the necessary environment for the
market based economy to perform effectively, by stimulating
savings and investment, including the attraction of foreign
investment, and maintaining international competitiveness
through maintaining a low rate of inflation. To achieve this
will require control over the budget deficit and monetary
growth, the need to reduce the large foreign debt and to
effectively utilise the large capital inflows from international
development agencies.
6.

Invest in human capital and physical infrastructure

there will be a pressing need for Vietnam to invest in the
education of its people and also in its physical infrastructure.
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Whilst Vietnam has plenty of cheap labour, this will not be
enough when it eventually hits shortages in trained and
skilled workers. As discussed earlier Vietnam's infrastructure
is also very dilapidated, and with limited domestic resources
the country will need to get access to, and use well,
international aid and assistance to upgrade its infrastructure.
7.

Creation o f strong and efficient institutions

Vietnam lacks the necessary institutions to support a market
oriented economy, which will have a detrimental effect, if not
tackled sufficiently quickly, upon the long term development
of the economy. It needs to develop a modem Central Bank,
an independent judiciary, a modem banking system and
supportive capital markets for the fledgling private sector.
Measures have already been taken to improve these but they
are still deficient on many fronts.
8.

Reduce its reliance on primary exports (oil, rice and seafood
products)

Vietnam remains exposed to fluctuations of world
commodity prices, given its heavy export dependence upon
crude oil, sea products and rice, which accounted for 52% of
total exports in 1994. Manufactured exports, supported by
foreign direct investment, will be required to make a larger
contribution to external trade in the future. Of particular
importance will be the development of exports of textiles and
garments, and electronics. Progress has been made in the
former as well as that of shoes, but the development of the
electronics industry is still at a rudimentary level.
9.

Prevent the North/South, and rural-urban split from widening

the gulf between the north and south of Vietnam, as a result
of history, politics and economics, threatens to become even
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more pronounced as free market reforms take root. Ho Chi
Minh City is destined to become Vietnam's leading
commercial centre and international focal point. In order to
prevent regional disparities the government will need to
divert more investments to the north and other
underdeveloped provinces. In addition growing income
differences between the rural and urban population would
trigger off urban migration, which has the potential for serious
disruption and instability.
10. Maintain political stability

whilst economic reform has been a key component of the
developmental program, political reform, or pluralism, is not
on the agenda. The coexistence of these two inherently
conflicting principles is a gamble, as in the case of China,
which the government is prepared to accept.
CONCLUSIONS

The recent economic performance of the Vietnamese economy
during its recent transition to a market economy has been
remarkable, with significant progress having been made in terms
of real GDP growth, savings and investment, inflation and export
growth to name but a few. Little multilateral or bilateral
assistance has been provided to the country during the period of
its economic reforms, and it has also had to adjust to the loss of
financial assistance from the former Soviet Union and the need to
reorientate its trade towards the dynamic East Asian economies.
A similar transition process has been conducted in Eastern
Europe with traumatic initial, and for some continuing,
consequences for output, employment and inflation, which
Vietnam has largely been successful at avoiding. However
Vietnam has only completed the first stage in the process of
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economic development, in which the existing slack within the
economy is being more fully utilised. The next stage will be more
difficult, requiring the need to improve the efficiency and
productivity of its fledgling market economy. Such will require the
need to improve the structure and institutions upon which the
economic system is based. If scarce resources are not utilised
efficiently and bottlenecks arise, the process of economic
development will come to a halt.
The tasks facing the authorities are many, however there is
much ground for optimism, despite the enormity of these, and
Vietnam is well placed to become the next Asian economic
dragon.
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